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Abstract 
The amount of research on the use of selfies as a form of care is scarce, with those focusing on 
mental health being non-existent. Following Foucault’s genealogy of madness, this paper 
attempts to analyse how forms of care enacted through the taking, posting, and viewing of 
selfies work to critique much of the discourse surrounding mental disorders. Starting with the 
position of selfies as purely a tool to help visualise those previously invisible, care is seen to be 
enacted in multiple ways as a distraction from life to allow survival. However, the analysis goes 
further to combine photographic theory, disabilities studies, and photo-voice interviews in an 
attempt to allow for a voice for the excluded position of the ‘mad’. Through a queer reading of 
narcissism and analysis of the combined embodied gestures in the selfie – commanding the 
viewer to both “look at me showing you me” and “look at me looking at me” - this paper 
argues that the image provides the possibility of reconstructing the disabled subject. In short, 
the aim of the research is to point at how selfies may be engaged to push towards the 
flourishing life for the marginalised mentally ill body. 
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Introduction 
With the rise in the prevalence of social media there has been a surge in the number of images 
posted by those people who have traditionally been constructed as disgusting. These publicly 
viewable pictures are increasingly democratising the ability to depict the self, allow for care, 
and create engagement with previously unseen situations. Social media is, therefore, of 
growing importance for understanding the performance of the disabled subject. This paper 
focuses specifically on selfies and attempts to analyse how they act as both a reprieve from 
daily life for those with mental health problems, as well as a more subversive form of care.  
Stuart Hall states that “identity is formed at the unstable point where the ‘unspeakable’ stories 
of subjectivity meet the narratives of history, of a culture” (Hall, in ed. Bhabha and 
Appignanesi, 1987, p.44). Following Foucault’s genealogy of madness, this paper attempts to 
analyse how forms of care enacted through the taking, posting, and viewing of selfies work to 
critique much of the discourse surrounding mental health and possibly provide some voice to 
the excluded and ‘unspeakable’ position of the ‘mad’.  
Sociological research on selfies is a relatively new area of study, only coming to the fore in 
2014 with the surge in popularity of the term in common usage during 2013. Academic writing 
on the topic peaked after International Journal of Communication volume 9, a special issue 
themed around these self-photographs in 2015. Before 2013 most articles on similar topics 
refer to selfies as ‘online self-portraits’ i.e Schwarz (2010), clearly noting part of the historical 
narrative these photos are placed in. Starting with an overview of the general themes that 
have arisen out of academia, and then moving on to suggest where this paper falls within 
them, I will note how the study of the self-care of those with mental illnesses has, importantly, 
been missed out so far. 
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Because of the nature of the discussion, the literature review is embedded within the 
introduction and the methodology rather than as a separate chapter. This is as a result of the 
need to both thoroughly outline the conceptualisation of mental health used, as well as the 
importance of visual sociological theory to this paper, specifically in the methods section. 
These tasks required a deep engagement with previous texts, and as such it felt arbitrary and 
exclusionary to outline and classify certain thought as relevant to a literature review separate 
to the methods. The literature not brought up in the methodology is placed in the introduction 
to allow for a detailed overview to the purpose and hopeful goals of the analysis. 
As with most social scientific study a broad distinction between quantitative and qualitative 
research on selfies can be drawn. The quantitative study is largely based around who takes the 
pictures or whether there is a societal wide addiction to them resulting in negative 
consequences. The term ‘selfitis’ refers to a supposed epidemic of people taking selfies, 
phrased in such terms to portray negativity. Quantitative studies, such as Balakrishnan and 
Griffiths (2017), Yuchang, Cuicui, Junxiu, and Junyi (2017) and Park and Choi (2017), attempt to 
analyse whether selfitis is real, and how best to measure selfie over usage. Looking at the 
papers that frame the images and process of taking them in a more positive light, most are 
based around some form of content analysis to determine the different usages of selfies by 
different groups of people, i.e those with depression (Reece and Danforth 2017), or gender 
variances (Doring, Reif and Poeschl 2016).  
Most studies of the selfie are based in some form of qualitative investigation however. Nemer 
and Freeman state that quantitative study “may obscure the vivid details of personal stories in 
the process of generalisation and cannot reveal how (especially marginalized) users, as unique 
individuals, understand, use, and interpret selfies and the specific impacts on their social lives” 
(2015, p.1834). The main body of work is based around a distinction of those who argue that 
selfies are narcissistic and bad for society, and those who state the opposite. Most academic 
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works argue for the latter while popular cultural sources and newspapers focus on the former, 
though there is a mixture in each category of both. These are empirical studies that take some 
population and analyse their usage of selfies to show why these pictures are narcissistic or not. 
Some examples of reports that take selfies as anti-social are Schwarz (2010) who states that 
online self-portraits, while thought of as increasing agency over representation, are rather just 
a consumerist means of self-advertisement to make more, but shallower, friendships. 
Newspapers and popular culture that also propose a negative narrative are Chamorro-
Premuzic (2014), Hart (2014), or Seidman (2015). Almost all the cultural critics have ‘clickbait’ 
headlines – titles that are attention grabbing and force a reaction – accusing selfies specifically 
of narcissism, and also often gendering this (i.e Seidman 2015). Even where newspapers 
attempt to combat this narrative they still end consistently discussing selfies only in relation to 
narcissism as well as gendering them. Time Magazine released a copy in May 2013 called ‘The 
Me, Me, Me Generation: Millennials are Lazy, Entitled Narcissists Who Still Live with Their 
Parents, Why They’ll Save Us All’ (Figure 1). The front cover features a picture of a young 
woman lying down and taking a selfie. Even though the editorial inside talks about how selfies 
Figure 1. Original Time Magazine Cover Figure 2. Edited Time Magazine Cover 
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and the millennial generation are not as narcissistic as thought, and are productive, ethical 
members of society (Stein 2013), the front page, article headline and other visible signifiers 
clearly reinforce a gendering and relationship towards narcissism. Time Magazine was ridiculed 
for their approach, with many people editing the front cover. For example, the introduction of 
the ‘troll face’ (Figure 2), a popular meme, as well as to alter the text to say: “Please fire us/We 
truly don’t understand how to report a story/Sorry”. Another made note of the gendering of 
the front cover (Figure 3), with the image of the woman slightly faded and extra text stating 
“Reminder that your body is only ever a prop in someone else’s fantasy”. Most of these 
modified versions simply change the ‘millennial’ subject to another in an attempt to ridicule 
the message and the constant linking of narcissism and social media usage (Figure 4).  
Academic articles often try to challenge the discourse of narcissism, through statements such 
as selfies are “nothing to do with narcissism or attention seeking. [The] selfie practice was 
embedded in a socioculturally dense context and cannot be reduced to a simple act of self-
promotion” (Nemer and Freeman 2015, p.1839). However, the qualitative research, as well as 
the popular culture reports, rarely attempt to analyse the use of narcissism to discipline 
Figure 4. Edited Time Magazine Figure 3. Edited Time Magazine 
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minority groups back into the norm. Instead academics repeatedly just deny selfies are 
narcissistic. Nor do they often engage with what the selfie is, or how it is discursively 
constructed through its placement in the historical tradition of photography. There are a few 
crucial articles that do this however. These attempt to move beyond the simple empirical 
study of whether a selfie is pro- or anti-social and instead critically engage with the ability of 
selfies to (re)produce identity.  
Butler (in ed. Fraser and Greco 2005) talks about the video of Rodney King being beaten by 
police as reproduced in a racially saturated field of vision. “According to this racist episteme, 
he is hit in exchange of the blows he never delivered, but which he is, by virtue of his 
blackness, always about to deliver” (in ed. Fraser and Greco 2005, pp.141-142). Similarly, there 
are a few articles that focus on the production of selfies in a gendered context and as such are 
read and referenced in order to (re)discipline ‘attention seeking’ women (Burns 2014, 2015). 
There are none that I have managed to find on the context of an ableist episteme, particularly 
important due to the creation of mental illness as, specifically, a visual Other, to be observed 
through bars in exclusion (Foucault 1988). Goldberg (2017) is the only academic who pays 
attention, not only to how discourse around selfies acts to further oppression, but also to how 
these images can attempt to subvert the genres in existence.  
Others that follow through with analysis of the transgressive element to these self-
photographs do so from the tradition of photography history and theory. Frosh explicitly does 
this through their application of terminology such as ‘indexicality’ and ‘composition’ to the 
selfie. They then look at how the selfie subverts the forms of these concepts as they exist in 
traditional photography. Indexicality refers to the “sense that photography is distinctive 
because what it depicts must have been located in front of the camera at the moment this 
photo was taken”, and composition to “the arrangement of elements within the space of a 
picture and their orientation to the position of the viewer” (2015, pp.1609-1611). Selfies act to 
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emphasise the constructed and composed nature of the photograph. Instead of just working as 
a record of an event taking place, to prioritise the present and say: “look at this as it is here 
now”, they attack the documentary and scientific gaze in traditional portraiture (Lalvani 1996).  
Analysis through the representational content is important as, according to Mirzoeff, “the 
postmodern is a visual culture” (cited in Rose 2013) with important questions to ask when 
looking at selfies going beyond the technocultural context of social media platforms to “how 
we see, how we are able to see, allowed, or made to see, and how we see this seeing and the 
unseeing therein” (Foster, cited in Rose 2013). 
Where mental health and self-care are analysed, outside the context of selfies, it is usually 
through the lens of positive psychology. ‘Self-Care’ in the health profession often refers to the 
ability of those with mental disorders to look after themselves without the need for therapist 
intervention1, rather than any political and structural notion. The conceptualisation of self-care 
in this paper builds on the queer theory of Lauren Berlant, using a crucial distinction she makes 
between self-maintenance (“cruising along” to survive) and self-knowledge (“exploring what 
might be possible”) (Duschinsky 2015, p.180). The theorisation is based around the notion of 
the ‘genre’. In ‘The Female Complaint’ (2008) Berlant defines these as the aesthetic 
frameworks that order our affects. Through them the world becomes sensible and 
communicable. They construct what it means to have a life, to feel, to succeed or fail at being 
oneself. Genres do not just organise and offer certain promises about life, they also come to 
be life itself. The example often cited by Berlant is that of a relationship. In them the meaning 
of what it is to have a good life is ordered, and even further, the relationship comes to 
represent life itself, with those inside it not imaging a possible world outside. Another example 
is put well by a quote from Žižek in the film ‘Žižek!’: “It’s much easier to imagine the end of all 
                                                          
1 See: Georgiadis and McPherson (2016) amongst others. 
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life on earth than a … radical change in capitalism” (Taylor 2005). Here, the object of desire 
represents more than just the object as it comes to be life itself.  
In the ordering of conventions of life, these affective attachments become “placeholders for 
intensities within streaming experience.” Duschinsky states that “their conventions give a 
place and pacing to – and thereby partially hollow out – the discrepancies and the possibilities 
which occur within the construction of a particular form of feeling subject” (2015, p.179). This 
‘hollowing out’ of our affects and desires is one measure by which we are restricted from 
realizing the good life, and it impacts some more than others. Berlant notes how queer life is 
more exhausting as there are so few conventions, and where there are they often restrict the 
subject from, or hollow out, any notions of love, feeling, success, and so on (Duschinsky 2015). 
Here we can see that genres are how we organise our experiences to allow us to get through 
the day. They must also, however, be engaged with as ways for us to invent new attachments 
that work better for us. 
Unlike Foucault, Berlant places a large amount of emphasis on the study of how these genres 
make our lives bearable, rather than just on how to transgress current attachments. Seeing life 
as a struggle she places great importance on those acts that allow us to take a break and make 
us be able view the world as inhabitable. While survival is crucial to her, she does not 
characterise it as a success. Survival is not flourishing. While the world may be better suited to 
some people’s ability to flourish than others, everyone has to take time to maintain 
themselves, even if that is just spending an evening doing nothing except watching a lot of 
television. Going even further, Berlant states: 
“Demanding encounters … force us to confront how little we want to disturb ourselves 
within the scenes of attunement we also must of necessity seek. One flails around 
wanting something other than what is, but one also fears the disappointment of one’s 
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lack of imagination and trust in the patience and inventiveness of others” (Berlant and 
Edelman 2013, p.110).  
Not only do we need to maintain ourselves to survive, but we also fear life without an object. 
It is hard to inhabit the world, but it may often be harder to change it.  
However, through the study of these genres Berlant comes to explore the boundaries of 
conventions, allowing for the creation of new ones, or an increase in space within a current 
attachment. One example is that of ‘flat affect’ in ‘Structures of Unfeeling: Mysterious Skin’ 
(Berlant 2015). Here she examines the performativity of affect in relation to the fact that a 
strong emotion is meant to represent the idea that something important has happened and 
reveal a truth about some internal state. In the film and novel ‘Mysterious Skin’ emotion is 
underperformed. Drawing from this Berlant comes to a new genre of affective response where 
the emphasis is placed on suspension and an allowance to “withdraw into whatever 
“whatever” style works” (2015, p.211) rather than the drawing into a specific and closed 
convention that hollows out emotion into a hyper-expressive form.  
The challenge for Berlant, as with Foucault, is that subjects are non-sovereign, they will always 
remain in a power system that constructs them. Hardt tries to clarify this by claiming that 
Berlant’s political project therefore matches up with that of Spinoza, and that both, instead of 
attempting to reduce relationality to others, try to “seek a greater proportion of active rather 
than passive affections” (2015, p.222). Hardt is stating that we need to increase the ratio of 
affective attachments that allow us to strive to those that cut off chances at flourishing. This 
paper understands self-care though these notions, of survival and attempting to push for 
striving, when analysing the use of selfies by those with mental health problems. 
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Most analysis using this understanding of self-care on social media focuses on the 
communities that have formed on different platforms rather than on selfies themselves, such 
as Jurgenson’s (2012) research on Pinterest as a safe space for women. The articles that do 
explicitly engage with selfies as a form of self-care don’t cover the experiences of those who 
identify as having mental illnesses. In addition, most of the discourse of self-care and selfies is 
through a prioritisation of white ‘visibility’ – “time passed and the selfie’s more general life – 
and difference affirming politic – which had previously allowed for a wide variety of non-
normative identities to circulate and receive validation on user-driven platforms like Tumblr 
and Instagram – whittled itself down to its most palatable iteration” (Dean 2016).  
This paper, and its focus on mental illnesses, fits into the current research by building on 
qualitative research that goes beyond analysis of whether selfies are narcissistic, and towards 
how their usage can be used to discipline or subvert. The focus on mental health is important 
as it hasn’t yet been covered in the academic field. However, further to this, it is crucial due to 
the links between the visual nature of selfies and modern society, and the socio-historic 
construction of madness to be viewed but not to speak. Having covered the conceptualisation 
of self-care that I use, I turn now to the methods used in this research. 
Figure 5. Quote from Popular TV Show ‘RuPaul’s Drag Race’ 
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Methodology 
Selfies are a visual medium and should be analysed as such, alongside the stories, process of 
production and distribution, and affect created by and through the image for those who took 
them. The regularity of posting selfies, the platforms used, the content, the meanings in the 
images are all crucial. Due to this both the aesthetic factors and the non-representational 
context they exist within need to be analysed. Frosh follows this up, stating that talk of selfies 
distinctiveness from earlier forms of self-depiction focuses mainly on the technosocial context 
than aesthetic developments. However, while true that “understanding that a particular image 
is a selfie requires viewers to make inferences about the non-depictive technocultural 
conditions in which the image was made” it is also true that “one cannot recognise an image as 
a selfie without looking at what it represents” (Frosh 2015, p.1608). This led me to use photo-
voice as an interview method. I use this analysis of the image and already existing work in the 
fields of queer and photography theory, and disabilities studies to examine the relationship 
between mental health, care, selfies, and society.  
Methods that prioritise the visual assign importance to what can be seen, over the classically 
textual and contextual analysis of sociology. Bourdieu, along with multiple other theorists, 
seemingly reject the content of a work, to construct a sociology of art that focuses on the 
situation it exists within for an understanding of it. Here the field of its production and display 
are important, however there is an indifference to the visual itself (Bourdieu, 1993). However, 
there are multiple reasons to consider this as important to engage with. Uimonen states, in his 
article analysing the importance of Facebook profile pictures for students in an arts college in 
Tanzania, that “by visually expressing themselves through profile photographs, users engage in 
the social construction of reality” (2013, p.122). Berger agrees, noting that the dominant male 
gaze objectifies the female nude in oil paintings. He carries his analysis over to modern 
advertising and imaging showing how the same issues occur there too (1972, episode 2). In 
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both of these instances, analysis of the images’ content reveals something about the 
participants, specifically about the actions by and production of the individuals (racialised, 
gendered) body. 
The visual reveals identities that would remain invisible through other means. Further to 
Uimonen and Berger, Jackson states: “visual methodologies may offer a more comprehensive 
picture of a particular social phenomenon by attending to the feelings and experiences of the 
participants, which may not be accessible in verbal exchanges alone” (2012, pp.426-427). The 
information in the work, rather than just the surrounding context, is therefore vital to 
comprehend in order to gain an understanding of meaning otherwise unavailable. If the data is 
irreducible to the textual or oral, then this is particularly important when analysing self-
photography. 
Beyond just an analysis of meaning and increasing the available data, the visual is important 
for its aesthetic qualities. Clark and Morriss state that “we may engage with the visual, and 
with the techniques that produce it, because we want to not only see, but also, perhaps, show 
others, what the world looks like” (2017, p.39). They argue that we must consider the 
relevance of an aesthetic, as opposed to a social scientific, analysis of works to fully engage 
with them. This is especially important due to the significant amount of theoretical analysis 
placing the basis of the construction of subjects in a form of aesthetics2.  
An example of the discussion of aesthetics in relation to mental health is Ross’s book on 
depression as a quality to be found in the formal structure of a work rather than solely in the 
body of the artist. Her analysis shows how “contemporary art … does not so much represent as 
enact depression in the triple sense of the verb: it simultaneously performs and contributes to 
the depressive paradigm, but it also acts out depression discursively, structurally, formally, and 
                                                          
2 See: Foucault and his “aesthetics of existence”, in particular in ‘The Use of Pleasure’ (1990, p.89). This 
is also seen in Rancière’s (2011) idea of the “distribution of the sensible” resting on an aesthetic base. 
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symptomatically” (2006, p.xviii). Research following in this line makes clear the need to analyse 
the representational content of any work to understand both the selfie as an embodied 
gesture, as well as a space for the construction and contestation of the disabled subject. 
Throughout this discussion, the relevance of the content of the self-photographs does not 
mean that no engagement with the context occurs. Context here doesn’t just mean the 
immediate surroundings of the images, the caption, comments, similar selfies, and memes, 
though these resulting significations are relevant and interlink with the representational 
content of the picture. For example, Reece and Danforth examined a number of Instagram 
accounts and found that posts with more comments were more likely to have been posted by 
someone with depression, where those with more likes followed the opposite trend (2017, 
p.7). While I do not focus on quantitative study here, the findings of their article show that 
there may be some use in contextualising the images in the meanings provided by the caption, 
likes, and platform.  
Beyond these immediate surroundings, the intent that went into the production of a work and 
the audience’s interpretation both also require an analysis of meaning in relation to specific 
actors. Hall, quoted in Sturken and Cartwright, states that “it is by our use of things, and what 
we say, think, and feel, about them – how we represent them – that we give them a meaning” 
(2000, p.4). Rose (2013) also points this out in her discussion of Barthes’ semiotics, noting that 
there needs to be a further consideration of the idea of a ‘social semiotics’ that analyses signs 
in relation to their context. Therefore, when analysing both the act of care and the selfie it was 
crucial to place them in the socio-historic discourse that produces them and allows for their 
use in certain ways. 
The method of photo-voice allows for a combination of the discussion of the content and 
context. Here the participants take photographs that highlight specific themes, and these are 
engaged with in discussions with the researcher. This combines an analysis of the content in 
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the image with the meaning for the creator of the work. By interviewing people you do not 
lose “the vivid details of personal stories in the process of generalisation and [instead] reveal 
how users, as unique individuals, understand, use, and interpret selfies and the specific 
impacts on their social lives” (Nemer and Freeman, 2015, p.1834).  
The decision to focus in on selfies, as opposed to the entirety of the content taken and posted 
on social media in an act of self-care, is partially to narrow the analysis down to allow for an 
attention to the specific functioning of self-photography. These pictures provide control over 
any framing of the self that is not possible in images taken by other people. Joanou (2017), in 
their article on the photo-voice project they participated in with street children in Lima, Peru, 
talks constantly about the importance of the process of the research and images involved in 
humanizing the participants by giving them control over their own image, as well as showing 
their perspective both to the researcher and to society more generally. The control over 
presentation of the self is particularly important for marginalised subjects, such as those with 
mental health illnesses, who otherwise are represented in specific ways by socio-historic 
constraints external to themselves. Self-photography, and the ability to choose where, how, 
and whether to post the picture online provides some semblance of power over their own 
identity.  
Not only are selfies constructed through and in operation in a distinct discursive framework to 
other types of photography, based in operations such as a gendering of them (Burns 2014, 
2015, Hills 2013), their technocultural context (Frosh 2015), and placement in photographic 
traditions (Brager 2014, Saltz 2014, Gómez Cruz and Thornham 2015), they also have 
substantially different representational content. Photo-voice allows for some engagement 
with the aesthetic elements of the selfies through discussions about the choices involved in 
selecting the framing, composing, and so on, as well as the affective content and response to 
the image. However, to study the aesthetic content of the pictures it has been necessary to go 
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beyond photo-voice and incorporate concepts and analysis from photography theory, though 
this has only been carried out in relation to and to further the topics revealed through the 
interviews. 
Alongside this analysis of personal photographs comes an ethical concern about the publishing 
of the pictures discussed. Moreno Figueroa warns against situating photographs in an article 
seemingly purely to satiate the “fascination” of the reader. She details the importance of 
“looking emotionally” in order to engage with the whole experience of a situation (2008). 
While the images are of importance to the researcher it is less clear that any reader of an 
article needs to observe them, especially where there are concerns over their response to 
doing so. Barthes makes a distinction between the “studium” and the “punctum” (1981). 
Studium refers to the general meaning in and interpretation of the viewed image revealing 
history, politics, information about the art historical tradition it exists in, etc. From this we can 
see that placing the selfie in the context of academic writing might change the meaning and 
interpretation of the image, and while that is certainly an issue, it is the punctum that Moreno 
Figueroa is more worried about. The punctum is the content of the image which we 
emotionally and very personally respond to beyond the meaning or beauty of the work. Here 
Barthes talks about the Winter Garden image, a picture of his mother who had recently passed 
away.  
“I cannot reproduce the Winter Garden Photograph. It exists only for me. For you, it 
would be nothing but an indifferent picture, one of the thousand manifestations of the 
‘ordinary’; it cannot in any way constitute the visible object of a science; it cannot 
establish an objectivity, in the positive sense of the term; at most it would interest your 
studium: period, clothes, photogeny; but in it, for you, no wound” (Barthes, cited in 
Moreno Figueroa 2008, p.69) 
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For Barthes the picture holds intense emotional value, but the worth is subjective and held 
only by him as the son of the deceased mother in the photograph. Following this he refuses to 
reproduce the image in his book even though it is crucial to the research that has been 
undertaken. When discussing and using selfies it is crucial to consider this element in the 
interview process by attempting to create and emotional intimacy between the participant 
and the researcher to interact with “how it feels and what it is like” (Moreno Figueroa, 2008) 
rather than just a neutral analysis of what is seen in front of you. Moreover, when publishing 
these images, it is necessary to consider the emotional intimacy with the participant and 
whether showing the pictures discussed breaks from this connection and replicates the 
content of the image while losing the punctum for the article’s audience.   
For this research on selfies, mental health, and self-care there has been significant 
engagement with photos with content of intense emotional value, some of the most forceful 
of these being of people who are recovering from eating disorders and have personal 
connections to images of them where they feel they look particularly attractive or not. While 
in the discussion about the image it was possible to “look emotionally” and consider the 
affective response and content of the photograph, this will not be the case for those seeing 
most of them reproduced in an academic text. Due to this I have carefully considered the 
selection of images to place in this text and only reproduced ones where these ethical 
concerns as to the loss of punctum are less of an issue, such as that of the ‘trash selfie’ (Figure 
6). Where there has been the need to detail elements of a certain picture or photo format, 
such as the ‘mirror selfie’ (Figure 7), and there has not been an example possible to show 
without the reduction of the emotional content being an issue, I have included a similar image 
of myself. Hopefully, my own selfies also act to, literally, place myself in the paper and 
highlight the constructed and subjective nature of the study and the role I have played as the 
researcher. 
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To get participants for my photo-voice interviews I created a private Google document asking 
for people’s names, preferred contact details, and what platforms they take selfies on. I shared 
this on multiple social media platforms (Facebook, Tumblr, Twitter, and Instagram) asking for 
anyone who identifies as having mental health issues and who takes selfies to respond. I kept 
responses confidential and deleted the Google document after contacting the eight people 
who I selected to be participants.  
I chose eight people for several reasons. The detail of the discussions had with each person, 
lasting around 45 minutes each, including discussions of three or four images as well as more 
general questions, meant that significant quantities of data was produced. Moreover, I felt 
that within this group I had a significant gender diversity, having two men, two non-binary 
people, and four women, with the increased representation of women justified by the 
gendering of care and selfies as female, and use of this gendering as a form of discipline. Due 
to posting from my personal social media accounts all eight people either attended the 
Universities of Oxford or Cambridge where most of my connections have been made. Also, my 
attempts at having an ethnically and racially diverse group were not as successful as I would 
have liked, with one British Punjabi woman, one white South African woman, five white British 
people, and one white US man. I also chose participants based on a range of social media 
platform usage, including one person limited to taking selfies but never posting them. 
When anonymising names there was a decision between using a fake name or using no name 
and instead ‘participant’, ‘interviewee’, etc. While using the word ‘participant’ may act to 
distance the reader and disembody the interviewee, I opted for no name regardless of this 
negative. Naming creates meaning, this can be positive in the instance of fake names making 
clearer the personhood of the individual being mentioned, however can also pose an issue. 
Just as Moreno Figueroa (2008) chose not to include pictures in the text as a political 
statement over the lack of trust in the audience of their article, the same argument can be 
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made for names. The racist episteme the reader looks at this paper in results in names 
conveying negative or positive signification in different ways based in the way they sound. 
Stating ‘participant’ is one manner in trying to overcome this. Secondly, also following from 
Moreno Figueroa’s article, names hold punctum for their ‘owners’ in many cases. They are 
emotionally filled, holding content outside their studium, particularly in the case of trans and 
gender queer people who have selected their own names as part of transitioning (Gibson 
2016). Referring to an interviewee through a fake name would be to show an emotional 
indifference to them, particularly to the importance of the personal value of the chosen name 
of one of the nonbinary participants. 
When asking for participants I asked for responders who self-identified as having a mental 
health illness. There are several issues to discuss including, amongst others, what I mean by 
the term mental illness and why it is justifiable to use this concept, the distinction between 
physical and mental health, and why self-diagnosis rather than clinical is my criterion. When 
talking about mental illness it is important to note there are multiple different conceptions of 
what this means, however the prevalent clinical accounts come from positivist medicine and 
are laid out in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). The DSM lays 
out all the disorders currently identified as mental illnesses and then talks about the symptoms 
and theorised biological causes of them.  
There are many internal debates as to the best wording of the DSM. The proposed criterion for 
identification of a mental disorder in the fifth version (DSM-5) have been critiqued and lead to 
some ambiguousness. One discussion hinges on the wording of criterion E: “that is not solely a 
result of social deviance or conflicts with society” (American Psychiatric Association 2013, 
p.20). This exists as a “safeguard against pathologizing social deviance” (Abouelleil and 
Bingham 2014, p.244) which is particularly important given the political misuse of mental 
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disorders to exclude other groups, such as the LGBTQ community with homosexuality being 
listed in the third edition of the DSM and not fully being taken out until 1987 (Burton 2015). 
On top of overt political intent to separate out a group, poor clinical standards and conceptual 
issues, like not recognising that psychiatric diagnoses are value laden, also lead to abuse 
occurring. Whilst there are attempts to overcome these, they still occur today with one current 
case pointed out by Netherland and Hansen being that of the reinforcement of racial 
hierarchies in the opioid crisis in the USA. Here, ‘White drugs’, those like OxyContin and 
Suboxone that were prescribed mainly to suburban White US residents, are decriminalised and 
medicalised, with the epidemic often being diagnosed through psychiatric disorders. At the 
same time the “more punitive systems that govern the drug use of people of colour” (2017, 
p.217) are left intact.  
Foucault attacks the clinical definitions, noting that “the very notion of “mental illness” is the 
expression of an attempt doomed from the outset” (1987, p.76). Instead of looking to see 
what wording of the DSM criterion mental disorders should be diagnosed through, we need to 
examine our understanding of mental health through the historic and socio-cultural 
conception of ‘madness’.  
“The recognition that allows one to say, “This man is mad,” is neither a simple not an 
immediate act. It is based, in fact, in a number of earlier operations and above all the 
dividing up of social space according to the lines of valuation and exclusion” (Foucault 
1987, p.78) 
In ‘Mental Health and Psychology’, later updated and extended in ‘Madness and Civilisation’, 
Foucault attempts to construct a genealogy of madness in order to examine the way past 
events have constructed our modern understanding of madness, psychiatry and mental health. 
One of the crucial developments, starting in the mid-18th century was that of the exclusion of 
madness, along with criminals, the poor, the disabled, and others, and placement of them 
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separate to society in internment asylums. In the classical era, and in the early days of 
bourgeois morality, this exclusion of madness was not based in any understanding of illness, at 
least not in the sense that we talk of mental illness, but rather through societies examining of 
itself and the resulting exclusion of unproductivity and ‘Unreason’.  
Across the course of the 18th and 19th Centuries these other forms of life were taken back out 
of the asylum and only the ‘mad’ were left in. Through this silencing and separation madness 
lost its language and began to be spoken of (using the speech of ‘Reason’) only as an Other, 
rather than through or by itself. “The language of psychiatry, which is a monologue of reason 
about madness, has been established only on the basis of such a silence” (Foucault 1988, p.x-
xi). Psychiatry, under this conceptualisation of mental illness, is a form of reason attempting to 
speak about madness while excluding it and keeping it silent. With the gradual medicalization 
of the mental at the same time as the exclusion of madness there was a shift towards what we 
currently see as mental illness. In the process stigma, personal blame, and moral guilt, which 
continue to exist in some form today, were directed towards disorders by early medical 
practitioners. Beyond medical understandings of disorders playing a role in the creation of 
shame, today clinical practice is not “interested in the root causes of suffering and 
unhappiness”. Instead “[positive psychologists] want us to focus on producing positive, 
optimistic affects by transforming our relationship to the often miserable and brutal social 
worlds we inhabit” (Wilson 2018, pp.175-176). Instead of examining mental health through the 
criterion of positive medicine one should attempt to engage with the political and structural 
causes of illness.  
Where Foucault often takes the mentally ill body as a passive object purely accepting meaning, 
it is important to note the contestation and creation of signification in this site as well. As such 
one should study both the socio-cultural construction of madness, but also look at the ‘mad’ 
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body as one that performs and acts to reproduce or subvert. Through this study of care and 
selfies I take mental illness as this idea of mental health beyond the clinical definitions. 
Berlant, unlike Foucault, takes note of the acts that people enact in everyday life in order to 
continue existing (2011). Foucault makes statements such as “’Psychology’ is merely a thin skin 
on the surface of the ethical world in which modern man seeks his truth – and loses it” (1987, 
p.74). These claims, while unintentional, push people away from seeking care or doing things 
that would allow for their continued existence in the harsh world. Even if these acts of care 
reinforce and reproduce the subject in a marginalized position they are still important for 
those who use them to be able to just get through the day. Care, here, can include going to 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy or taking anti-depressant SSRIs, these construct the subject and 
their biological make-up at ‘fault’ and de-politicise the reasons for increasing rates of 
depression and anxiety (Dardot and Laval 2013). Regardless, they are crucial for the survival of 
many people with mental health problems, and to deny this would be to claim only an 
‘abstract’ liberation where those with illnesses are forced to suffer. “In this scene, activity 
toward reproducing life is neither identical to making it or oneself better … such activity is 
directed toward making a less bad experience. It’s a relief, a reprieve, not a repair” (Berlant 
2011, p.117). Foucault’s tone places him in a position of superiority to ‘psychology’ and to 
those that use it for survival. While he does raise an important critical view, it is also important 
to not degrade the position of those that are already excluded further and allow them to 
continue caring for themselves, even if these do also reinforce their precarity.  
In this research I examine the medicalized conception of mental health and explore whether 
selfies and self-care offer any critique of this. As a result, my focus is on mental, rather than 
physical or chronic illness. It is important to realise the interconnection of the multiple forms 
of disability, for example the significant study surrounding the relationship between 
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gastrointestinal disorders and eating disorders3. Therefore, while I split mental illnesses from 
others, I keep in mind the medical links as well as the intersectional nature of marginalisation.  
‘Mental health’ is itself a big category. When asking for participants I didn’t specify the mental 
illnesses I would accept or reject for the people wanting to be interviewees. This was, in part 
not to limit myself to certain clinical criterion, but also because there are commonalities across 
the construction of mental illnesses. In the clinical world mental illnesses are largely 
determined by their symptoms rather than any neurological state, with the DSM-5 criterion 
stating mental disorders are determined through “syndromes” or “patterns” that “reflect an 
underlying psychobiological dysfunction” (American Psychiatric Association 2013, p.20). Ross, 
therefore, notes that while the DSM does try to differentiate ailments, due to there being 
broad similarities across many symptoms, as well as common misdiagnoses, ‘depression’ 
becomes an ever-broadening category encompassing almost all the others (2006, p.xvii). This 
block categorising of mental health into depression is common across society where illnesses 
are, en mass, constructed as Other, rather than individualised. This otherness in everyday life 
can be seen through the current pattern of newspapers questioning the ability of Donald 
Trump to run the country, not due to poor policies or management of bureaucracy, but instead 
of the basis of health4. While there are variations between different mental illnesses, this study 
doesn’t attempt to block them together, instead it takes a broad sample in order to critique 
the entire construction and oppression of mental illness. Where there have been variations 
noted they have allowed a revealing of forms of care and usage of selfies that would have 
been limited had I focused only on a one.  
Also, partially out of concern for restricting myself to a clinical view of mental health, I asked 
for people who self-identified as having mental health issues, instead of just those with an 
                                                          
3 See: Perkins, Keville, Schmidt, and Chadler (2005) or Abraham and Kellow (2011) amongst others. 
4 See: Hamblin (2018), Lee (2018), or Batchelor (2017) amongst others. 
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official’s diagnoses. On top of this fear of limiting my conception of mental illness there are 
structural issues that block certain groups more than others from visiting health care 
professional, and therefore I didn’t want to exclude these people or the importance of their 
selfies and self-care. Mind UK (2017) and the National Alliance on Mental Illness (2018) in 
America have released statistics on the estimated number of undiagnosed people in their 
respective countries of work. Some of the reasons for this are: a fear of family or cultural 
response, underfunding and lack of training for health professionals (Ratnarajan 2016, 
Anonymous 2016), or the gendering of certain illnesses such as ADHD meaning young women 
have less of a chance of being diagnosed (Crawford 2003). By accepting people who self-
identify as having mental health problems then this research attempts to avoid those 
structural issues to the largest extent possible. 
During the process of the interview the photo-voice method practically entailed spending 
about 15 minutes discussing general themes about selfies, social media, mental health, and 
care, and then moving on to around 30 minutes looking at 3 or 4 images selected by the 
participant. During the first 15 minutes I started by asking “Do you take many selfies?” and 
then the conversation built on from their answer. The themes in the first section were then 
carried over into the second part of the interview looking specifically at the pictures.  
Before meeting the interviewees, I asked them to select a few selfies that they had taken that 
covered a range of different selfie types, platforms posted on and reasons to have taken them. 
This vague and broad criterion for selection of the images to discuss was central to allowing 
the participant full control over identifying what was important. I didn’t want to specify certain 
platforms, that the selfies had to have been shared, that they had to enact a specific form of 
care, and so on due to worries over my own personal experiences with social media biasing the 
discussion through setting the agenda as to what could be included.  
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I outlined to the participant that they could leave at any time, everything would be 
anonymised, both on the transcript and in the final paper, and that they could ask me not to 
publish any images they didn’t want me to. I gave them my contact details so that they could 
contact me later if they changed their mind about anything to do with the ethics and consent 
of the research. Half way through, at about the 25-minute mark, I stopped the recording to 
make sure the microphone was picking up the voices. I then used this pause for a break to 
allow the participant to think over what they stated and if they wanted to continue. 
Drawing from queer and feminist theory, there are several other issues that I attempt to tackle 
within the research process. Thompson, quoted in Reinharz, sates: ‘I could see the woman’s 
face and hear her exclamations and pain’ (1992, p.35). Following from this, and other similar 
statements, I have transcribed the interviews, however have done so whilst noting that the 
change in medium results in a loss or different affective impact. The transcribed discussion can 
distance the reader from the emotion and pain that is audible in the recording or visible in the 
image. This removes an audience from a source of meaning, however, more importantly, it 
also distances the researcher from practicing any reflexivity. Instead attempts should be made 
to embed themselves in the situation and attempting to take feelings seriously.  
Rooke states that “while queer theory has decentred and fragmented the research ‘subject’s’ 
subjectivities, the self that is producing much cultural research remains somewhat distant and 
stable”. Instead she believes “an intellectual commitment to queer theory and queer 
methodology requires and epistemological openness and attention to one’s own … subjectivity 
and the performativity of the self in the research process” (2009). Rooke is noting that in much 
classical theory, even where queer methods have begun to gain credibility, there is still a 
separation of the ‘cartographer’ from the subject under discussion. Instead of this we are 
tasked with opening ourselves to the field and letting it reconstruct us, just as we also 
construct the field as the researcher. I have attempted to practice this in a few ways. Whilst I 
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did transcribe what was said, I used both the written and audio information I had to come to 
my conclusions, listening and reading over both multiple times.  
To attempt further reflexivity the discussion in the interview was as unstructured as possible. 
Instead of specific questions to answer and then move onto the next one there were only 
general themes to consider. These general themes were introduced in an opening question or 
moved onto naturally in the discussion of the images and then I, as the researcher, asked 
follow-up questions based in the participants answers. This allowed both me and the 
participant to have joint control over the direction of the discussion as I was not forcing 
specific questions upon people, but rather focusing on thoughts that originated with the 
interviewee. Furthermore, I clearly participated as someone who also identifies as having a 
mental illness. Instead of distancing myself as a neutral observer I placed myself into the 
conversation as someone who suffers and performs themselves in many of the same ways.  
The enactment of reflexivity was not perfect however. There are systems of knowledge 
production even internal to the identity as mentally ill. As such I tried to not construct the 
analysis around my version of illness and engage with other selfhoods that may be opposed to 
my own. There was inevitably still some accidental re-centring of myself however. This was 
most clear in the topics that I chose to pick out of the discussions and focus in on during the 
interviews. While I did try to minimise this as much as possible through speaking far less than 
the participants and only asking vague questions, there is still the need to note that the 
research outcomes were produced through an interaction between my subjectivity and the 
participants. 
The rest of this paper is split up into four main sections. The first, ‘Self-Care, Control, and 
Visibility’, covers how selfies work as a break from everyday life. It also covers how these 
images may change people’s perceptions through increasing control over depiction and 
visibility for the disabled subject. The second, ‘The Hidden Visible’, looks at how these acts of 
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self-care cannot work purely through providing visibility to a ‘hidden’ body. There is further 
analysis of how the images are viewed in an ableist episteme and the resulting need to create 
an association with the mentally ill subject or attack the dominant ideology. Section three, 
‘Look at Me Looking at Me’, follows the account of the images as just visualising the body by 
attempting to show how the selfie is an embodied gesture stating: “look at me looking at me”. 
This section engages with how selfies can transgress the critique of narcissism placed at them, 
as well as with the work of Coleman and Moreno Figueroa (2010) the role of hope in seeing 
the self as beautiful. The final area of analysis, ‘Mental Health, Self-Care, and Capitalism’, 
focuses on how both care and mental health have been constructed, in part, through 
capitalistic and neoliberal discourse. Here I look at how some uses of social media end up 
reproducing the subject as individualised, but also how the taking of time to focus on the 
‘undeserving’ self is an act of “warfare” (Lorde, cited in Ahmed 2014). 
Self-Care, Control, and Visibility 
“So I think that’s what self-care is like. It’s being softer with yourself, but then I think in 
many instances it’s like preservation, and that preservation can also be like provocative 
in some sense right. Like self-care is also loving your body and there’s different ways to 
do that right and some of those ways can be provocative.” 
This quote from one of the participants makes clear that self-care is both about being able to 
continue to survive through the day, as ‘preservation’, as well as this more ‘provocative’ type 
which acts to subvert genres and attempt at a flourishing life. Throughout the interviews many 
references are made to the use of selfies as a break from everyday life. Berlant notes that, 
though this act of care may reproduce life in its current oppressive conventions, it acts as a 
relief from the struggle of the intensities of survival. This conceptualisation of self-care is the 
‘common sense’ understanding of it in society and is common across popular culture. Many 
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songs, for example Solange’s ‘(Borderline) An Ode to Self-Care, poetry, tweets and much more 
details this. In an interview with ‘W’ magazine there is an interchange between Solange and 
the questioner that goes:  
“Q: You have a song in the album called “(Borderline) An Ode to Self Care.” What does 
self-care look like to you? 
A: You know, I probably wrote that because I need to manifest it more in my life. Even 
in the midst of this last week with the multiple murders of young black men that 
occurred, I chose this time not to watch. Just for the sake of being able to exist in that 
day, to exist without rage, and to exist without heartbreak.” (Gevinson 2016) 
Here it is clear that self-care for Solange looks like Berlant’s ‘reprieve’. The idea of sometimes 
choosing not to watch to continue with existence is key in the answer given. The bombarding 
of the message that black people are a disposable part of U.S life wears away at the ability to 
remain seeing the world as inhabitable. Therefore, instead of continuing to participate or 
attempting to oppose the norm in this situation Solange chose ‘this time not to watch’.  
This is seen also through the interviews in multiple different ways. Most of the participants 
spoke either of taking and posting of images as allowing them to feel “a little bit more in 
control of everything that was going on” or “as a reminder that [they] can do it”. These 
photographs are not necessarily for others, even if they are posted. Instead those taking and 
posting them can stop and take a photo, and then move back on with life. When having a bad 
day with mental health, this halt of the everyday allows a brief moment of separation where it 
is possible to note that you have friends who are there to like your shared photos, that you 
look good, or otherwise. The normal is then moved back to, but now with a renewed sense of 
being able to carry on, even if there have been no changes to the situation and the mental 
illness is still negatively affecting life.  
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These moments of separation are not necessarily about manufacturing happiness however. 
One of the participants mentioned how hard it is to produce and sharing her selfies: “but just 
thinking now like with all this thought that goes into selfies and then to posting, its so like 
fraught and yet like, we do it, or people do it, and I do it, as an act of self-care, yet like it’s such 
an emotionally draining process”. Care enacted through selfies is mentioned in tandem with 
the process of writing in a personal diary or journal. The process of writing a private journal 
entry requires a focus on the self and, specifically, on the moment being recorded. It takes 
significant effort to do satisfactorily, may be stressful, and makes the author consider how 
they are feeling. Even if shared, it is not the others response that matters but the process of 
writing. This is true also of the creation of the selfie. Instead of creating happiness and moving 
beyond the hardships of the mental illness, selfies are a moment allowing distraction and 
processing of feelings – the finding of a space within, rather than outside, the disorder. 
In a discussion between Berger and Sontag, Berger states “what the story narrates and tells is 
sheltered within the story from oblivion, forgetfulness, and daily indifference” (Berger and 
Figure 6: ‘Trash Selfie’ 20/02/18 
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Sontag 1983, 2:37). Here, another important feature of the writing of a journal, and the taking 
of selfies, is brought forward. Not only is the process of creation a break due to the distraction 
from the everyday and the need to process feelings, but also there is the concretisation of the 
self, moment, or memory in the outcome. This is seen particularly in the fact that often selfies 
are taken, not shared, and not looked back on, but instead just stored on the phone (see 
Figure 9). This mirrors the fact that journals and diaries are rarely re-read after being written. 
This doesn’t mean that the outcome doesn’t matter and only the process of production is 
important. Instead it is the knowledge that what the disabled subject considers important is 
solidified against “daily indifference” and can be looked back on if wanted to but is rarely 
actually done so.  
Joanou (2017) states something similar with the self-portraits in their photo-voice project 
providing a humanizing element for the street kids, allowing them to document their existence 
and concretise memories they consider important. This is crucial for the self-care of those with 
mental health issues as it provides some solidity in life against circumstance that seem 
uncontrollable and puts importance to an oft ignored voice. One particularly severe case of 
destabilisation and the discounting the voice is a common occurrence called “diagnostic 
overshadowing” where medical practitioners don’t trust those with mental illnesses and refuse 
to prescribe medicines, belief descriptions of symptoms, or state physiological conditions are 
just a result of psychological ones – in other words, “get over it, it’s all in your head” (Garey 
2013). After such a lack of faith in the disabled subject, this concretising of memories and 
moments in the photographic evidence of selfies, even if very subjective, is vital. 
This feeling of increased control over life is produced through the control over depiction that 
the selfie returns to the taker. Tiidenberg notes that self-photography allows a “reclaiming [of] 
control over one’s embodied self AND over the body-aesthetic” (2014, p.1, capitals theirs). 
Whereas in traditional portraiture another takes the image, in turn choosing the composition 
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and, ultimately, the aesthetic of the body, the selfie reverts this with the photographer being 
the photographed. This was mentioned many times throughout the interviews, with one 
participant going as far as to say, at the end that “you can summarise all that we’ve talked 
about as this, yeah it all comes back to control”. This same person stated: 
“With selfies you can very much control how you appear to the outside world. Whereas with 
other people taking pictures, because, well obviously with my eating disorder if people had a 
camera out I literally, I would be like absolutely not, like angry, that was my reaction like actual 
anger. Um but then I could very much control like the image and so it helped me.” 
Not only does self-depiction reclaim the aesthetic of the body and allow for the enactment of 
self-care as a break, it is necessary for some to feel comfortable with images of themselves at 
all. Whether the taker thinks the pictures make them look good or bad, there was at least the 
knowledge that is was them taking themselves as they wanted to be so, and it was entirely 
within their power to choose what to do with the image after. It could just be immediately 
deleted, as is done in many cases. This control over depiction works to enable self-care as self-
maintenance, but also manages to work to subvert. 
Žižek, in ‘Less Than Nothing’, talks about the Higgs boson particle, mentioning it is “called the 
“God particle” [because] it is a “something” of which the “nothing” itself is made, literally the 
“stuff of nothing”” (cited in Rodrigues 2012). The point he is attempting to make is that 
situations that seem like a “nothing” are sustained by “something”. To be accepted in society 
those with mental illnesses often have to put effort in to hiding a part of themselves. One of 
the people in the interviews for this research noted that their ADHD led to them being seen to 
be “chatting shit at people all the time” and that this was harmful to their life. There is an 
aspiration to normalcy here, a “desire to feel normal and to feel normalcy as a ground of 
dependable life” (Berlant 2007, p.281). In order to be normal, in this case to blend in and be a 
“nothing”, a significant effort needs to go in to produce that state. However, this same person 
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stated that they did need somewhere to “just blughhh but in a social manner”. As such their 
Snapchat acted as a place where they “chronically overshared”. Sharing selfies, with captions 
and visual edits, then acted as a form of self-care due to it being a space where it was 
acceptable to not put in this extra effort to be normal.  
The idea that social media, and in specific the sharing of selfies, allows openness to the ‘real’ 
self is copied throughout many of the interviews where others mention that they are able to 
share their “honest thoughts”, “honest photos”, and “truthful, honest captions”. This notion of 
authenticity comes from the construction of the self by the self, even if this is still a subjective 
and composed situation. The ‘realness’ acts to expose the “something” that holds up the 
“nothing”. Here the selfie creates a separation between the ‘real’, oversharing self that enacts 
their hyperactivity, and the hiddenness of this in the everyday. The photo acts to provide 
visibility to an invisible and does so through the control of representation lending to a notion 
of authenticity in the image. This is furthered in the case of the participant with ADHD 
mentioned above by the name of their Snapchat account being ‘X’s Head’ (where X is the 
person’s name), giving a sense that their posts are sharing the internal, actual self.  
It is not clear that control is fully granted to the selfie taker however. When talking about 
transition videos and the communities they form on YouTube, Horak notes that they are 
emancipatory in the sense that they have allowed for a personalised representation of the 
trans experience, rather than one dominated by the mainstream media. However, he also 
notes that “YouTube should not be mistaken for a utopian space. The popularity of transition 
vlogs, and of hyperactive, predominantly white vloggers, institutes hormone time, beauty, 
gender cohesion, and whiteness as uncomfortable norms” (2014, p.582). The oppositional, 
subversive space has formed its own restrictive genre. This is true of selfies. Whilst self-
photography takes away the other of the photographer in traditional portraiture, social media 
platforms and the communities on them restrict what is considered a desirable image. 
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For mental health and body positivity Tumblr appears to be the most extreme example of this 
constraint. Every person who was interviewed who currently or previously used Tumblr 
mentioned both how nice, but also how toxic, it was as a place. This is nicely summarised by 
one of the interviewees as “Tumblr I feel is kind of like the safest place to put selfies because 
you’re kind of like expected to be narcissistic but at the same time as expected to hate 
yourself.” The control over the image is both expanded and constricted here. In one sense, 
these communities are really positive. They make people feel comfortable with posting 
personal stories and others respond and validate these. Large care communities have formed 
around different mental illnesses, and these have been crucial in people’s recovery, for 
example #anorexia and #anorexiarecovery together have over 7 million public posts on 
Instagram, almost all of which are pictures of food or selfies, with people charting, and sticking 
with due to the sharing, the overcoming of their eating disorder.  
At the same time, these genres are also exclusionary and force people to express their health 
in a certain manner. On Tumblr the expectation to hate yourself allows an ease of posting 
Figure 7: ‘Mirror Selfie’ 12/05/18 
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pictures of self-harm or captions detailing an anxious panic attack, however it also forces 
people to hyper-visualise these elements in order to gain recognition. Selfies not to do with 
the mental disorder are not shared or responded to as much, with validation mostly being 
given to those who have constructed their online identity solely around their illness. This leads 
to a shallow performance of identity and a loss of this notion of “honesty” or “truth” in the 
depictions. This restriction also leads to, as one of the participants said, a “cyclical” problem 
with “everyone feeding into everyone’s issues and not really like bettering, not encouraging 
people to get into a better place.” 
These restrictive genres, while an issue, are still subversive in some sense due to their creation 
of an oppositional norm, which can still, in part, reveal the “something” holding up the 
“nothing”. Moreover, each platform has its own genre surrounding the posting of content, and 
all the interviewees who had stopped using Tumblr moved to a different site where they felt 
better able to express themselves. On top of this, these genres have formed out of a desire for 
validation from others, and they succeed in providing that. Berlant states that “because of our 
desires not to be defeated by life, we enter into the scene of relationality that is also and 
ultimately a demand for collaboration, relationality disturbs fantasy enough that it is open to 
crazy controls and also to absorbing and generating new social relations” (Berlant and Edelman 
2013, p.110). It is this relation to, and collaboration with, others that leads to new genres but 
also what allows us to continue on through life.  
The idea that individuals should get all their validation from their own self is not a possible 
form of life, especially for those who are structurally denied a positive conceptualisation of 
themselves. Instead selfies, against a trend in the rest of popular media suggesting the need to 
“love yourself” (Figure 5), provide empowerment through “(re)constructing confidence and 
receiving acknowledgement” from others (Nemer and Freeman 2015, p.1833). These 
platforms are not utopic spaces, however they do allow for more room to move around in than 
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offline life, and in doing so attempt to push at the boundaries of the generic every day by 
visualising an invisible. 
The Hidden Visible 
If selfies are going to be understood as subversive through what they make visible we will need 
to understand the concepts of visibility and hiddenness. Crucially it is not just the increase in 
control allowing for the ‘internal’ to be shown that is important, but also the socio-cultural 
reception of that image that matters. Butler’s (in ed. Fraser and Greco 2005) discussion of 
Rodney King and the video of him being beaten by police as reproduced in a racially saturated 
field of vision notes this need. What should have been a video making visible police brutality 
against a black man was used as evidence for the acquittal of the officers. The content cannot 
be taken outside of racist episteme it is reproduced in.  
A more recent example of visibility occurring in a racist field is described by the hip hop artist J. 
Cole in his song Neighbours. The lyrics detail how visibility isn’t necessarily beneficial for the 
black body with: “Black in a white man territory/Cops bust in with the army guns/No evidence 
of the harm we done/Just a couple of neighbours who assume we slang/Only time they see us 
we be on the news in chains” (2016, 2:10) The song tells the true story of him setting up a 
recording studio in a wealthy neighbourhood in North Carolina. The white neighbours assume, 
because of the large quantities of black people going in and out of the house and the fact the 
racist cultural knowledge produces them as criminals, that they are dealing drugs and so call 
the police on them. The music video then shows the CCTV footage of a SWAT team arriving 
and breaking and entering. It is due to situations like this that Dean (2016), using the work of 
bell hooks, declares the “#visibility” movement to suffer a white feminist narcissism which is 
blind to the imperial gaze constructing a different social status for black women which has 
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been held not just now but also historically. This is also true of the ableist episteme that selfies 
are distributed in. 
Bull uses Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘aspect seeing’ to explain different forms of hiddenness. 
Here a distinction is drawn between seeing someone ‘as an alien’ and seeing them ‘as alien’. In 
the first instance, seeing a human ‘as an alien’, there is just a misrecognition where coming to 
see them as a human involves deciphering so from their appearance and behaviour. In the 
second case where someone is seen ‘as alien’ the as structure to see them as human is 
missing. It is not just an instance of seeing someone differently (now seeing them as an alien, 
now as a human), but seeing them in a different way. This is similar to how even if robots are 
seen to have the same behaviour and appearance as a human we do not recognize them as 
such. The as structure to see them as human is missing. Whereas a human dressed as a robot 
may be seen as a robot, then come to be seen as a human when we recognise the behavioural 
traits.  
Here, “acknowledgement differs from traditional accounts of knowledge in its recognition that 
the acceptance of other minds is not a matter of establishing their existence but of opening 
oneself to them … This is something more than simply seeing” (1999, p.204). It is not an 
identification of a body, but instead an identification with a body. This is important: selfies can 
act to make visible the hidden, however the issue is not an identification of the black or 
disabled body, but instead an identification with such body, to see commonalities. The 
oppressed body is objectified instead of seen as a subject, and selfies, as photographic objects, 
further this objectification supposedly in the name of subversion. It is through this that 
embodied mental illnesses can be both hyper-visible, but also an invisible Other.  
Not only are selfies-as-care that work to increase visibility not necessarily subversive, they are 
also used to discipline back into the norm. “This is not the straightforward imposition of 
dominance on a subordinated minority but an example of the legitimization of the principles of 
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social organization by virtue of their appearing to originate from everywhere” (Foucault, cited 
in Burns 2015, p. 716). The construction of narcissism as gendered, and selfies as narcissistic, 
acts to legitimize the outcry at “vain” and “attention-seeking” women who take these self-
images. In turn these women become valid targets of punishment and correction in comments 
under images, or elsewhere both offline and online. This works to further the policing of the 
female body.  
An example of the construction and disciplining can be seen in the Chainsmokers song and 
music video “#SELFIE”. Some of the lyrics are: “I only got 10 likes in the last 5 minutes do you 
think I should take it down (take the selfie off Instagram)”. On top of this, the singer never 
allows or cares about anyone responding to her and instead the song is one long monologue. 
These elements clearly portray the act of taking a selfie as one of self-indulgence. The band 
has also replaced their usually male lead vocal with that of a woman, furthering the gendering 
of the act. This clearly resonated with a lot of people, with the music video on YouTube having 
received 526,966,439 views.  
Beyond the gendering there is also a relation to care. in the chorus one women is supposedly 
having a conversation with another in a nightclub and it follows the pattern of: we should go 
and do x (smoke a cigarette, get a drink), “but first, let me take a selfie”. Here the selfie is 
situated as an act that breaks from the regular life of the club. The statement of ‘but first’ 
places the photography as something distinct from the rest of the club life, which will then be 
moved back to once the picture is taken. The content of the selfie itself is meaningless to the 
song, and in the music video we never see the actual picture taken by this woman. What 
matters is that the event, the taking of the photo, happened (The Chainsmokers 2014). #SELFIE 
relates the selfie to the act of self-care as maintenance, as taking a break from everyday life to 
be able to continue surviving once it is moved back to. Crucially then, this song doesn’t just 
highlight the intertwining of narcissism with selfies, but also with self-care. Popular culture like 
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this arises out of the construction of selfies, self-care, and narcissism as gendered, and also 
acts to reproduce this in society. This legitimises the female selfie taker as Other, as abnormal, 
to be pushed back into the ‘correct’, ‘normal’ form of life. 
This disciplining is especially bad for mental illness due to the visual nature of madness:  
“During the classical period, madness was shown, but on the other side of bars; if 
present it was at a distance, under the eyes of reason that no longer felt any relation to 
it and that would not compromise itself by too close a resemblance. Madness had 
become a thing to look at: no longer a monster inside oneself” (Foucault 1988, p.70) 
This quote points towards the fact that madness had become no longer identified with the 
human even though it was still seen. Where, in the Renaissance era, the apocalypse and the 
‘other world’ were the big dangers to be safeguarded against, moving towards the mid-18th 
century, madness became the enemy internal to us all. However, with the exclusion of it in 
internment asylums, this Unreason within every person was separated out and there was no 
longer a commonality between the ‘normal’ world of Reason and the Other. Madness was left 
a thing to be viewed from the position of the norm, and through this mental health is seen 
similarly.  
“As for a common language, there is no such thing; or rather, there is no such thing any 
longer; the constitution of madness as a mental illness, at the end of the eighteenth 
century, affords the evidence of a broken dialogue… The language of psychiatry, which 
is a monologue of reason about madness, has been established only on the basis of 
such silence” (Foucault 1988, pp.x-xi) 
Not only is mental illness left as something to be seen, it is also left with no voice. If there is 
speech it is through the language of Reason, with speech about mental illness being that of the 
clinician about the patient while they remain silent. Therefore, selfies and captions purely 
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trying to visualise the ill body will be buying into this ableist discourse by speaking through the 
discourse of exclusion and othering. When self-harm scars are shown it builds upon the 
disabled self as disgusting. Disgust is Nussbaum’s term, noting that there are commonalities 
between responses to bodily wastes and, in the case she is looking at, homosexuals, but this is 
also true for madness. As Foucault has noted Reason doesn’t want to associate itself too 
closely with mental illness for fear of contamination. This is an irrational disgust response 
where “even to look closely at what a gay teen does is to be defiled” (Nussbaum 2010, p.xii) – 
specifically “if object A is disgusting and B looks like A, B is also disgusting” (Nussbaum 2010, 
p.15). 
Attempting to make others identify with the body shouldn’t be a task which crushes difference 
though the process of buying into the norm. White, ableist, heteronormative culture works 
though, as bell hooks states, “eating the Other”, where “the acknowledged Other must assume 
recognizable forms” (1992, pp.21-26). On top of the need to become recognizable as human, 
there is the need to reclaim difference from the hegemonic acceptance of the disabled or 
black self which commodifies these Others. Instead of accepting black culture in all its forms, 
there is a flattening of difference and an appropriation of sections of this life into the white 
norm.  The parts that are appropriated are those that let the status quo to remain, while still 
allowing the proclamation of acceptance. This is how the black body can be fetishized in 
popular culture, both sexually and as a profitable tool, with musicians and actors like Beyoncé, 
Donald Glover, and Kanye West all being foregrounded as ‘American culture’ even though they 
talk about the racial oppressions of the country5.  
While a relationship that can be problematised, and in many instances works through different 
means, similarities can be drawn between these forms of racial inclusion and those of mental 
                                                          
5 See: amongst others, the recent Guardian article titled ‘The Rise of Donald Glover: How He Captured 
America’ (Bain 2018) is a good example. 
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health. Neurodiversity is a medicalised biological term for the inclusion and celebration of the 
neurological differences between those considered normal and those not. There are two 
issues here. One is that, in practice, there is not this positive reception to difference but 
instead an Othering of people who do not socialize or form connections in the culturally 
regulated norm. Where mental disorders are ‘integrated’ it is only the partial eating of the 
Other. The treatment of autism is a good example of this, where the neurological diversity is 
accepted only when behaviour is normal or productive – in a recognizable and acknowledged 
form. Autism is often stereotyped as allowing an individual to think beyond the possibilities of 
the ‘normal’ person, usually applied to an ability to do maths or a similar subject well. From 
this there arises a fetishization of autistic people where creativity is boosted, for example, as 
one Guardian headline says, ‘Autistic Employees Can Give Companies an Edge in Innovative 
Thinking’ (Jones 2016). Beyond this, the aim to neurodiversity itself is flawed. bell hooks states: 
“Hence, it is not African American culture formed in resistance to contemporary situations that 
surfaces, but nostalgic evocation of a “glorious” past” (hooks 1992, p.26). In the case of 
neurodiversity as a goal, what is celebrated is the biological and neurological difference, while 
rejecting the cultural and personal elements to illness that have formed in a society that 
constructs madness as Other.  
Not only is the task of being recognized as human difficult for those already marginalized due 
to the irrational disgust response, the acceptance of the ill body is a violent act of making 
invisible radical elements of the self while hyper-visualising tolerable ones. More than just 
visualising the body, selfies can be understood as in need to engage in a deconstruction of 
dominant ideology and attack it, accepting and reclaiming difference in an overt manner, 
while, or separately, working within that ideology to subvert it by showing similarity and 
humanness.  
Look at Me Looking at Me 
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In order to analyse what a selfie does other than simply visualise the self we need to analyse 
what a selfie is – how it is constructed. While one form of self-care for the interviewees seems 
to be a documentation of their memories and experiences, these self-images seem to break, in 
part, from this aspect of traditional photography. The Cartesian perspective when taking 
pictures of others places the photographer, and in turn the viewer, behind the camera as a 
transcendental subject, beyond the content of the image. Here the photo acts as ‘evidence’ 
that the event took place, as documentation. This is noted by Frosh as the ‘index as trace’, 
leaving an immortal ‘trace’ of those events that will not pass even when the content has done 
so. He also states the existence of another form of indexicality as well however, ‘index as 
deixis’. Where index as trace is “a material trace foregrounding the temporal relation to 
pastness, index as deixis is the pointing finger drawing attention to a present object” (2015, 
p.1609).  
The selfie may work to document the present. However, it also, due to the relationship 
between the photographer and photographed as identical, notes the performative nature and 
communicative element of the image, stating: “look at me and see what I’m doing now”. This 
goes even further with the temporary photography of Snapchat and Instagram, both of which 
were noted as important to multiple participants, due to the index as trace no longer existing 
with the image disappearing after viewing or after 24 hours (Jurgenson 2013).  
One of the interviewees brought along what they referred to as a ‘trash selfie’ (Figure 6). This 
depicted ‘trash’, in this case a dirty laundry basket, with the caption ‘it me!’. The participant 
stated they felt there was a trend of posting these images as ‘selfies’, in a broad sense of it 
being about the self, because it allowed them to mention their anxiety or self-deprecating 
feelings in a safe or joke manner: “Yeah, so obviously like with a trash can I would be like it’s 
me, and I’m joking, but also I’m not joking”. In the trash selfie there is the obvious sense of 
“see me showing you me” that Frosh (2015, p.1610) notes with the caption directing attention 
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to the possibility of looking at and seeing “me”. Moreover, it points attention to showing how 
they feel about themselves, directing back to the notion of ‘authenticity’ and the ‘internal’ self.  
While Frosh is significant in noting that the selfie is a ‘gestural’ image, he only concludes that 
the photo states “see me showing you me”. There is an important step missed that goes 
further than this however. Instead of just “look at me showing you me” the selfie also says, 
“look at me looking at me”. There is a crucial difference here. What Frosh misses is the fact 
that, in order to take the picture, the self must gaze upon the self, either overtly, in the case of 
the mirror selfie (Figure 7) or through the front facing camera (Figure 8) as most selfies are, or 
indirectly with the back-facing camera. The selfie is both, at once, constructed for others and 
also constructed by the self. The gaze of the subject is both looking out of the image at the 
viewer, but also looking into a mirror at themselves. They are seeing themselves both made 
object by the external, and as subject in the reflection. This is a departure from the norm in 
and of itself as where else do we see the mentally ill getting to look at themselves and that be 
Figure 8: ‘Front Facing Camera Selfie’ 24/11/17 
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presented on a public stage. Instead we only usually get cinematography depicting mental 
health as Other, or medical photography making the disorder scientific and clinical and 
removing it from the ill self in a violent act.  
Sontag writes that “there is something predatory in the act of taking a picture. To photograph 
people is to violate them, by seeing them as they never see themselves, by having knowledge 
of them that they can never have; it turns people into objects that can be symbolically 
possessed” (2005, p.10). There is a separation between those who see and those who never 
get to see. This is particularly true with medical photography. Lalvani talks of how Cartesian 
anthropological photography created the scientific idea of race, and in turn constructed the 
modern racialised body (1996). This is also true for the disabled body. Medical images have 
furthered the idea of the ill body as other, to be excluded.  
Gilman, when talking about Morrisroe’s subversive artistic portraiture of himself with AIDS on 
a hospital bed, mentions that there is an assumption of a visually marked, ugly and undesirable 
body, however that this is combatted through a sexualisation in combination with the 
vulnerability (1995). Morrisroe deconstructs the discourse around illness though subverting 
the depictions of his experience with AIDS and ultimately his death. Selfies can attempt to be 
transgressive through their visualisation of the mentally ill body, but they also importantly go 
further through making obvious the composition hidden in the supposedly objective, and 
scientific images. While the images may make claims to some sense of authenticity, with the 
person in the self-photograph representing themselves as they ‘truly’ feel, this also 
foregrounds their subjectivity. Where the composer is hidden behind the camera, along with 
the viewer in traditional photography, making invisible the arranging of elements, the 
personalised positioning is clear in the selfie. Moreover, the fact a person can depict 
themselves as they want to be seen means the images are often taken to be a “highlights reel” 
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or not what someone “actually looks like”, but instead a photoshopped version with the 
negative elements hidden.  
Returning to the idea of the act of care making visible that the non-event, the “nothingness”, is 
held up by “something”, we can see subversion occurring beyond just showing the body. Here, 
then, there is an association with the disabled self as human in offline interactions. Effort goes 
into making the self ‘normal’, usually still just an acceptable and commodified Other. However, 
there is then a distinction drawn between the online and offline self, where the selfie on social 
media breaks from this aspiration to normalcy and acts as a safe space. The foregrounding of 
the personalised construction of the self-photography, along with the distinction between the 
online and offline self, points towards the creation of the self in the picture, but also in offline 
‘reality’. Here there is a combination of the linking of the disabled self that is accepted as 
human and the mentally ill Other, with the highlighting of the ‘unacceptable’ difference. The 
‘mad’ self is shown to be the same subject that is acknowledged as human, yet at the same 
time the Unreason, hidden in everyday engagements, is still visible. The act of subversion is 
limited to those who are able to make themselves identified with offline however, a situation 
denied to many who cannot put the effort in, or where it is impossible, to hide part of 
themselves, but instead are hidden by society as a non-human Other.  
Returning to the RuPaul quote in figure 5, “if you can’t love yourself, how in the hell are you 
gonna love someone else” (2017), there is a second reading that reveals a second way the 
selfie can act to be transgressive as a form of care. Where before this was taken to mean you 
should love yourself externally to the world, and selfies were counterposed to this as allowing 
for a more realistic form of validation including others, this prioritisation of the self can also be 
taken as a radical reclamation of narcissism. Goldberg (2017) talks about the critique of selfies 
as narcissistic as a claim that removes difference. Narcissism, in popular belief, refers to the 
idea of an over focusing on the self at the expense of relationships with others. However, as 
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mentioned already, due to its use in disciplining ‘deviants’ back to the norm, this accusation is 
one that works at the expense of otherness. Instead there is a need to reclaim a queer version 
of narcissism that respects difference, while focusing on the self and rejecting the world.  
The original myth of Echo and Narcissus by Ovid is a tale about the goddess Echo, and 
Narcissus who is the object of desire. Narcissus rejects all his suitors, and, after rejecting Echo, 
she calls out for misfortune to fall upon him. As a result, the gods smite him for his insatiable 
desire for himself, and, upon seeing his reflection in a pond, he becomes infatuated and passes 
away due to not being able to drag himself away. Here Bruhm states that “as Narcissus rejects 
Echo and the boys who want him, he rejects … the dictate to desire another (a socially 
prescribed and approved other)” (Bruhm, cited in Goldberg 2017, p.5). Lunbeck (2014) notes 
how the current conceptualisation of narcissism arises out of the psychoanalytic tradition, 
from Freud, who links it with homosexuality. Here, the homosexual is such because, unlike the 
‘normal’ heterosexual, they have failed to move beyond childhood self-love, and as such, 
desire the self, or those like the self – the same gender. Instead of taking Narcissus as he who 
has too much desire for the self, as the negative critiques of self-love and self-absorption seem 
to suggest, he should be taken as the person who “rejects”.  
Narcissus, when ‘self-absorbed’, is rejecting the social obligation to create the correct social 
bonds, and in doing so to reproduce the constraints placed upon him as a failed Other. Just as 
selfie takers are accused of inhabiting an unreal space and presenting a fake ‘perfect’ version 
of themselves6, Narcissus is pre-occupied with his own image and unable to return to the 
needs of his ‘real’ self. Goldberg, through his queer reading of the myth, reveals that the ‘real’ 
in this allegation is a discursive proxy for ‘normal’ society. As such, through rejecting the ‘real’ 
world, the selfie taker is rejecting others and reclaiming desire for the self. This problematizes 
                                                          
6 See: amongst others the BBC article ‘The Truth Behind Selfies and the Life of a Typical Instagram User’ 
(Anonymous 2017) is a good example. The meme ‘Instagram vs Reality’ also demonstrates and builds 
into the accusation, as can be seen in its least sexist form in the Buzzfeed article ‘A Day in the Life of a 
Girl on Instagram vs. Real Life’ (Parker 2014). 
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the very notion of the ‘real’ world. Placed before as a situation we are required to focus on to 
be legitimate, selfie-takers reject the actions and desires of the norm and expose the real as a 
disciplinary construction. Reading RuPaul’s mantra through this light leads us to take the “if 
you don’t love yourself” to be a claim towards rejecting the other that constricts you and 
loving yourself as an act of care.  
Missed in this queer reading of ‘Echo and Narcissus’ is the importance of the character of Echo 
and her relevance to this discussion of selfies and care. Where Goldberg focuses on the male 
character of Narcissus and his relevance to a queer reclaiming of self-love, it is important, 
especially alongside the gendering of narcissism and selfies, to note how Echo can be read 
through Foucault’s conceptualisation of the denial of language for the mad. “she of the 
echoing voice, who cannot … learn how to speak first herself … Echo only repeats the last of 
what is spoken and returns the words she hears” (Ovid 2000). Just as Foucault notes the 
silencing of the language of madness along with its exclusion in the Classical era, Juno silenced 
Echo after she tricked the goddess. Both are forced to speak the language of another in order 
Figure 9: Phone Camera Content 02-03/02/18 
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to describe their situation – the mad having to echo the language of Reason to describe their 
Unreason, and Echo having to use Narcissus’s speech to describe her love for him.  
Everyone who spoke about their mental health in my interviews either expressed their 
illnesses through the language of clinical medicine, or explicitly stated that they thought about 
it within the context of their discussions with their councillors or psychologists. As has already 
been discussed, the language of clinical medicine “is a monologue of reason about madness” 
and “has been established only on the basis of a silence” (Foucault 1988, p.x-xi). Therefore, the 
participants, when trying to talk about their disorders, are doing so through the language of 
another –voicing their ‘madness’ through a discourse of Reason.  
Echo, however, manages to express, in part, her feelings for Narcissus. Through the process of 
being rejected she reclaims her ability to convey meaning while still only using the voice of the 
other. Given the inability for the mentally ill to break out of their place in history and the 
manner they have been constructed, there is an impossibility of being a transcendental subject 
with the ability to create a new mad language. Instead, there must be the (re)claiming of the 
language of Reason that has formed in the silencing of Unreason, just as Echo uses the other to 
convey meaning. 
Through both the rejection of societies dictations to become a ‘normal’ subject, as well as 
through (re)claiming language, it is possible to see how selfies can act to be subversive. A 
narcissistic form of care, where the self works to love the self, can be seen particularly in figure 
8 and 9. Figure 8 shows a front facing camera selfie with photoshopped editing highlighting the 
love of the self with captions talking about how great the photographer/photographed self is. 
Figure 9 shows the many selfies taken that are never posted, only kept stored on the phone, 
and are for personal use only. Both of the cases shown are my selfies, however mimic similar 
photos as those discussed by participants in the interviews. These acts consisted of a form of 
care, with participants using the photos for many reasons. In one case the participant was 
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taking a picture because they felt they looked attractive that day, and in another the 
interviewee was attempting to reduce anxiety about physical features by looking at 
themselves and taking photos until they were happy with how they appeared.  
Here the images are less a statement of “look at me showing you me” and more about “look at 
me looking at me”. The reclamation of narcissism is foregrounded. Instead of taking the selfies 
for others, these acts of care are taken for the self. The disabled subject’s confidence in their 
own image is improved through gazing upon themselves rather than through others’ 
confirmation. This refusal of the ableist gaze is an act of care, but also transgressive in its 
rejection of entering into a communication with the ’reality’. Through this acceptance of the 
role of the failed subject there is a (re)claiming of the language of narcissism. 
On top of this, in many of the selfies discussed in the interviews, there was a (re)claiming of 
the language of mental health. These selfies continue to be dispersed in an ableist episteme 
where the visualisation of mental health is taken as Other from behind bars, however there is 
a ‘double madness’ in these images. The mad are constructed as such and excluded, but also 
there is a madness in the acceptance of the position as, and in the use of the language of, a 
failed subject. Through this the selfie denies the right of the viewer to gaze upon the subject as 
if the image were constructed for them, instead the image commands to be seen specifically as 
the mad self looking at their madness and accepting their difference.  
While this subversion doesn’t attempt to gain an identification with in order to be realized as 
human, it prioritises the highlighting of ‘unacceptable’ difference in an attempt to make clear 
the status quo is ‘eating the other’ in their only partial integration. This understanding of 
reclamation is similar to Ahmed’s when noting: “As with other political acts of reclaiming 
negative terms, reclaiming wilfulness is not necessarily premised on an affective conversion, 
that is, on converting a negative into a positive term. On the contrary, to claim wilfulness 
might involve not only hearing the negativity of the charge but insisting on retaining that 
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negativity: the charge after all is what keeps us proximate to scenes of violence” (2013). There 
is an acceptance of the position of madness. Instead of attempting to become part of society, 
or to reduce the violence in the labelling and act of objectification, the insistence on remaining 
“proximate to scenes of violence” is what allows transgression. It is the madness of opening 
yourself up to be labelled as mad, and accepting this position, that makes the selfie crucial as a 
form of radical care.  
While reclaiming the language of narcissism would be significant, it is also important to 
remember that there are valid charges that do not attempt to discipline back into the 
hegemonic norm. Returning to the accusation of “#visibility” selfie feminism as a white 
feminist politics, bell hooks notes its “narcissism so blinding that it will not admit two obvious 
facts” (cited in Dean 2016). This is not a discourse disciplining the self-photographer, but 
instead a legitimate claim over the fact that some feminists ignore racial difference. Therefore, 
while the critique of narcissism may sometimes be used as a tool to flatten difference, it can 
also be used to call out oppressive acts. It is imperative then that when there is a ‘queering’ of 
the concept the reclamation is also done in a ‘queer’ manner to avoid further constrictions 
upon others.  
Beyond narcissism, the command to “look at me looking at me” works to bring the self in the 
image into the present. When talking about beauty Coleman and Moreno Figueroa state that it 
is an “inclination to a perfected temporal state which involves processes of displacement to 
the past and of deferral to the future” (2010, p.357). Here beauty is taken to be something 
which, instead of being felt in the present, is an inclination to another temporal state where 
the self is thought of as normal. An aspiration to normalcy is identified by Gimlin as the reason 
for women to diet, exercise, and so on (cited in Coleman and Moreno Figueroa 2010).  
Berlant’s concept of ‘cruel optimism’ is useful for looking at the way beauty works. She defines 
cruel optimism as “when something you desire is actually an obstacle to our flourishing” (2011, 
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p.1). The notion is about being stuck in the object world you exist within, where the object you 
desire and believe is necessary for life itself, is actually the very same object that causes the 
stifling of the good life in the first place. It is the object that offers a promise of a better life, 
and through that allows us to continue on living, while at the same time restricting life. The 
American Dream is an oft described example of this. This ideal is the goal of life that makes it 
possible to continue. It provides the potential of a better life and the ‘freedom’ it promises 
becomes life itself, with no valued existence outside of it. However, at the same time, the 
American Dream is a cruel force which, while attached to, compromises the very opportunity 
to achieve flourishing.  
Beauty, for Coleman and Moreno Figueroa, is a form of this cruel optimism. There is the 
promise of a life of beauty in the future or a remembrance of a glorious past that allows the 
subject to continue moving on in the world, however, at the same time as making life 
bearable, it restricts the ability to feel normal in the present. This idea of an aspiration to a 
normalcy never located in the present can be tied into concepts other than beauty as well. 
Those with mental illnesses and constructed as Other are denied the right to the comfort of a 
dependable base in the current from which to accept themselves, and as such can strive for 
being seen as human in a different temporality. Linking back to the selfie as an act of looking at 
yourself, and the viewing of it as “looking at me looking at me”, the image works to destabilize 
this cruel optimism and push for a reclaiming of normalcy in the present. 
The taking of selfies was an anxious moment for many of the participants for this research. Not 
only was there the fear of other’s judgements of narcissism, there was a noticing of the self by 
the self, usually denied to those excluded and made to only be viewed by others.  
“Participant: … um but yeah no I definitely used to post more selfies. 
Interviewer (Me): Why do you think that is? 
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Participant: Um because I was a lot more insecure in my identity and used it as like a 
sort of tangible way of identifying myself as something, as someone, … “ 
Here, almost explicitly, the participant brings forward the importance of being able to see 
themselves, and take a photo to record this, is stabilizing how they felt. This act of seeing 
herself as “something” and as “someone” nicely correlates to the objectification of the self in 
the index as trace, and the subjectification, or touching the person in the present with index as 
deixis. Index as trace brings forward what Jurgenson states as “the nostalgic gaze”. Here, “the 
present is always apprehended as a potential past” (2013). He goes on to say that temporary 
photos on social media platforms like Snapchat, due to their inability to document with their 
disappearance, foreground the present as the present, rather than a prioritised relation to the 
past or future. Selfies also do this. Unlike temporary photographs they still allow for the index 
as trace as they can be stored to look back on, however they still contain the index as deixis, 
which is what brings the viewing of the photograph back into the moment of the present.  
Coleman and Moreno Figueroa come up with a conceptualisation of hope as an alternative to 
(cruel) optimism. Through “a return to and recognition of the unfulfilled actuality of the 
present [there is] a means of challenging the difficult present by re-experiencing the past” 
(2010, p.371). Here, the looking at images of the past self allows, not a bringing of that feeling 
to the present, but a noting that the self can be beautiful. Instead of a temporal connection to 
the past or future where those selves are seen as separate from the current self, hope allows a 
collapsing of these relations into an understanding that the photo is of the present self, and as 
such an understanding, based in the ‘now’, that it is possible for the self to be beautiful. This is 
similar to the index as deixis in the selfie, and moreover, the act of looking at the self in the 
taking of the image.  
“I mean like very frequently when I take selfies I am absolutely feeling myself and I 
think I’m literally hot as shit and then I’ll look at the photo and go “damn yeah”. But I 
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guess that’s where the negative comparison comes in because I guess I’m, if I look back 
at that when I’m not having a good self-image day then I’m like oh wow I guess I have 
the potential to look hot, but I don’t anymore.” 
This quote from one the participants who identifies as recovering from an eating disorder 
reveals the role of the selfie as both pushing normalcy to the past and future, as well as 
collapsing the temporal relations to have a positive understanding in the present. The index as 
trace in the selfie allows for a negative comparison of the self in the image with the self 
viewing the picture – “I guess I have the potential to look hot, but I don’t anymore”. On top of 
this there is Coleman and Moreno Figueroa’s ‘hope’ in the looking back at the photo and going 
“damn yeah”. This is not so much a thinking of the current self as beautiful, but rather a noting 
of the relation to the past “hot” self. Beyond this however, in the production of the selfie there 
is a gazing of the self upon the self. As separate from traditional portraiture, where the subject 
could not see themselves until after the image was taken, only to view them as they were in 
the moment of shooting, selfies require a look in the moment itself. This can be seen in the 
“when I take selfies I am absolutely feeling myself and I think I’m literally hot as shit”. The self 
on the screen, or in the mirror in the case of the mirror selfie, is the other self with which there 
is an identification of beauty. With this there is a link made between that other, two-
dimensional, self, and the photographer.  
Sticking with Coleman and Moreno Figueroa’s statement that it is not possible to have a 
present beauty, only the collapsing of temporalities, with ‘hope’ as opposed to ‘optimism’, in 
the taking of the photo, the gaze doesn’t necessarily make the subject themselves feel 
beautiful in the current moment. Instead it collapses the distinction between the “hot” image-
self and the photographer as far as is possible, creating joy in the here and now of the selfie 
taking. The act of care for the self, as a break from the everyday through taking a self-
photograph to solidifying identity and reducing anxiety, has had transgressive effects in its 
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exploitation of hope through the collapsing of temporal relations with the past and future and 
returning to the present.  
When looking at the above analysis of how selfies can act as a form of care, both as 
maintenance and subversion, it is crucial to note their links to the neoliberal technosocial 
context. Not only is the idea of ‘taking a break’ commodified, for example with multiple 
interviewees mentioning how care in the UK has become tied to the cosmetics shop Lush, and 
in particular their bath-bombs, but care has become necessary for the functioning of 
capitalism. Beyond this, multiple authors suggest that depression, amongst other mental 
illnesses, “is in fact the obverse of performance – a response by the subject to realize and be 
responsible for himself, to surpass himself evermore” (Dardot and Laval, cited in Wilson 2018, 
p.292). Therefore, in order to talk of selfies as transgressive it will be necessary to analyse how 
they interplay with the technologies of modern capitalism. 
Mental Health, Self-Care, and Capitalism 
Some theorists claim that the practice of self-care is not as subversive as thought7, with the 
neoliberal technologies of the self already demanding care as allowing, and necessary, for 
productivity, constant change, and improvement. Foucault notes that capitalism both helped 
construct madness as Other in the 18th century, and also leads to mental illness and Unreason 
to occur in the contemporary era due to the alienation involved in its linguistic, economic, and 
social relations. “The cardinal sin in that world of trade had been defined; it was no longer, as 
in the middle ages, pride or greed, but sloth” (Foucault 1987, p.68). Sloth, or unproductivity, 
was then linked with madness, poverty, and disability, all of which were then put in 
internment. This process was part of the construction of what we come to see mental health 
as today.  
                                                          
7 See: Davies (2015), and Cederstrom and Spicer (2015). 
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Measures introduced to deal with the ‘mental health epidemic’ are often implemented less as 
a means to help those who are struggling, but rather to push them back into work due to the 
loss for the country if these people take days off or likewise. One of the main reviews 
undertaken by the current Conservative government about mental health was titled ‘Thriving 
at Work’, with Teresa May giving a speech stating the negatives of mental health as “£42 
billion each year” with this being the reason “we need to take action” (Prime Minister’s Office 
2017).  
Furthermore, Foucault states: “when man remains alienated from what takes place in his 
language, when he cannot recognise any human, living signification in the production of his 
activity … he lives in a culture that makes pathological forms like schizophrenia possible” 
(1987, p.84). Here he is pointing towards the fact that capitalistic relations are the cause of 
mental illness’s prevalence. A more extreme example of this would be the recent debates over 
the status of ‘burnout’ as an illness. There are calls for burnout syndrome, a set of symptoms 
brought about though over stress and lack of enjoyment of work, to be treated, in part, as its 
own distinct disease (Bianchi, Schonfeld, and Laurent 2015). While those suffering are certainly 
in distress and justified in going to therapy as a form of care, the medicalisation of symptoms 
only acts to cover up an important cause of burnout – the structural problem of the hardships 
of labour under neoliberalism.  
On top of the construction of care through capitalism, according to Wilson “neoliberalism 
governs through technologies of the self, and so self-care becomes central” (2018, p.160). 
Technologies of the self are a Foucauldian term described as those “techniques that human 
beings use to understand themselves … which permit individuals to effect by their own means, 
or with the help of others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies” (Martin et al 
1988, p.18). According to Wilson, with the financialization of everyday life and the privatization 
of happiness under neoliberalism there is an incitement to look inwards and focus on 
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transforming the self. The financialization of daily life is the process by which the self comes to 
be nothing more than capital to be appreciated over time. Risk management and regular 
auditing of the self through reflexive practice become key, such that even our relationships to 
others come to be played out economically – based on personal gain and loss. Turkle puts this 
nicely as: “financialization necessitates narcissism, but a narcissism that is not about excessive 
self-love, but self-fragility” (2011, p.177). The understanding of narcissism as self-fragility here 
is distinct from the queer reading based in the admiration of the self and rejection of the 
societal norm. Instead it is an inditement to value others based in what they can provide to the 
self.  
With the privatization of happiness there is a proliferation of self-help books, increasing 
academic support for the positive study of happiness, and a reduction in public infrastructures 
to help support people. Contemporary society places individual’s emotional states in their own 
hands. Just as neoliberal capitalism leaves people considering their economic fortunes to be 
their own fault, hiding the structural forces that have an influence on outcomes, it does the 
same too with emotional fortunes. This leads to individualised practices of self-care, but 
instead of subjects acting by themselves in a manner that subverts, they perform in line with 
the status quo and remove their health from the political and structural realm.  
With both mental illness and care placed in relation to the need to improve as an asset, acts of 
care in popular culture are less about taking a break or subverting the socio-cultural structure, 
instead being about doing exercise because it is a “miracle cure” to mental illness that will 
boost productivity, as one article by the Daily Mail suggests (Stacey 2017). Wilson states that 
these actions of caring for oneself “are certainly cites of coping, getting by, and, at times, 
survival. However, these practices of self-care encourage us to internalize and thereby live by, 
the very same neoliberal logics of privatization, self-enclosed individualism, and personal 
responsibility that are causing all of these hurts in the first place” (2018, p.164). These 
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technologies of the self are therefore another example of Berlant’s notion of cruel optimism 
(the first being ‘beauty’ in the discussion of Coleman and Moreno Figueroa (2010)).  
With the notion of cruel optimism, we can see how even those practices of self-care which 
attempt to be subversive are not. Care of oneself as coming to understand or appreciate the 
self, or exploring the limits placed upon subjectivity, are not a failure of the genre of 
neoliberalism, but are part of, and, in fact, a crucial element to, the genre itself. Berlant notes 
that “even the prospects of failure that haunt the performance of identity and genre are 
conventional … those blockages or surprises are usually part of the convention and not a 
transgression of it, or anything radical” (2008, p.4). Self-care, instead of being subversive, is 
part of what makes the genre of neoliberalism ‘interesting and rich’, and it becomes a form of 
cruel optimism where the subject is stuck in their object world.  
With care individualised and financialised, it is communities of self-care that allow for a return 
to transgression. On social media networks form which provide support and help 
differentiated peoples survive together. Twitter hashtags fit this nicely. Twitter feeds move 
beyond each individual act of self-care and the focus is placed on the communal, with the 
continuous scrolling of each post all linked to the same theme in line with the hashtag 
searched. There is not so much a single personality that comes to dominate, as there is a 
collectively created space which sometimes is used to combat a norm of the convention.  
The community of care can recently be seen with the trends such as #disabledbutcute where 
people post selfies of themselves to highlight that they have an illness, mental, physical, or 
otherwise, but that they are still ‘cute’. Here, there is a highlighting of the larger structural 
elements through participating in care for oneself, not as an individual, but as part of a larger 
collective. The disability, and usual othering of the ‘abnormal’ body, in #disabledbutcute is no 
longer a purely private sentiment but a common experience. Horning states that the “selfie is 
shorthand not just for pictures you take of yourself but instead for one’s self in social media” 
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(2014). Where some processes of subversion rest upon the individuals content of the image, 
the collective of selves on social media may be a crucial element in others. The 
individualisation of care is combatted, not through the personal enactment of care, but instead 
with the non-importance of the representational elements within the network. The collective 
of selfies provides a possibility of no longer taken through Turkle’s neoliberal narcissism, but 
instead represent a reduction of personhood to the platform posted on. 
Horning notes the neoliberal nature of the main platforms where selfies are posted however. 
“The selfie doesn’t invent a language of identity; it marks a voluntary entry into established 
codes, reinforcing their validity even if a particular selfie tries to subvert them … The selfie 
breaks us out of the cage of static identity, but the platforms they are posted on shove us back 
in, associating and attempting to integrate all data they generate” (2014). The reduction of the 
individual to the community doesn’t attack neoliberal individualisation when the community 
reduced to is one controlled by the capitalist algorithm that reinforces the system. According 
to Horning, in order for the selfie, and the enactment of care through them, to be of 
importance, the platform posted on would have to already not be capitalistic.  
While it is the case that posting selfies does buy into the status quo in many ways, this is true 
of all acts within the capitalist spectacle. Any argument that a political performance works to 
fully transgress the system, as if acting as a transcendental subject, is misplaced given the 
construction of the self within the discursive framework attempting to be broken out of. Lorde 
states: “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house”, and it is true that the 
selfie has arisen within and become appropriated by the ‘masters’ as their own. The points 
raised by Horning and Wilson are fully correct for some selfies, and partially true for all selfies. 
However, they miss out the truly radical nature of self-care enacted by ‘undeserving’ groups. 
Lorde importantly goes on to propose that “[the master’s tools] may allow us temporarily to 
beat him at his own game” (1984, p.112).  
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The reclaiming of the selfie as a tool for care doesn’t allow a dismantling of the house but 
provides the possibility of survival and a temporary transgression. The representational 
content of the selfie does matter, with the visual (re)claiming of the self in the self-
photography allowing for subversion of certain norms, for example through the queered 
narcissistic picture in the case of the discussion of Echo and Narcissus above. On top of this, 
the excluded self, even if they are recreating themselves in line with neoliberalism, is re-
inventing in ways that are not recognised or acknowledged by the status quo. This underpins 
the hegemonic order in some ways, however still highlights difference with the unacceptability 
of the non-appropriated parts of their existence.  
Ahmed denies the claim that self-care, for those who are ‘undeserving’ of time, attention, or 
welfare, is a neoliberal, rather than radical, act.  
“In refusing to care for him, we are judged as caring for ourselves, where this ‘for’ is 
assumed as only and lonely. Self-care: that can be an act of political warfare. In 
directing our care towards ourselves we are redirecting care away from its proper 
objects, we are not caring for those we are supposed to care for” (2014).  
Where this research so far has been noting specific subversive elements to selfies enacted as 
forms of maintenance, Ahmed states that all acts of taking time out to allow continuing 
existence are radical when done by individuals who are usually denied the privilege of doing 
so. The deserving bodies are those who are in a less precarious position. While tragedy may 
happen even in privileged lives, it is this crucial access to existing communal structures that 
help in relief of pain. For those who are not deemed worth caring about these structures are 
ones they need to create for themselves, either individualistically or through the creation of a 
community. The narcissistic and individualistic act of recreating themselves, taking a break, or 
existing separated from ‘reality’, is crucially combined with a critique of the structure when 
redirecting away from the ‘proper objects’. Self-indulgence is a crucial element to the political 
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when taking time from those deemed worthy and attempting to survive where the selfie taker 
was no meant to. Through the discussion of the relation of selfies, care, and mental health to 
neoliberalism we can see how self-photographs (re)produce the status quo – they both 
recreate it as the norm and generate new signification through the forms of subversion. 
Conclusion 
Selfies are enacted as a form of self-care for those identifying as having mental health issues in 
many different ways, some as a break from society, others also to subvert the status quo. As 
forms that enable a reprieve from the struggle of the everyday, the selfie lets those with 
mental disorders concretise memories or experiences, along with identity, though 
documenting them. In the process of documentation there is also the distraction from the 
harsh moment and an ability to take time to think through feelings. Ahmed’s use of Lorde’s 
idea of ‘self-care as warfare’ posits these situations as subversive, where the undeserving 
‘mad’ self is re-allocating resources in the order and helping build systems of support to 
survive. The selfie allows this as a result of returning control to the taker, not allowed in 
traditional photography.  
Self-photography can be transgressive through other means as well. “Life/Death: the paradigm 
is reduced to a simple click, the one separating the initial pose from the final print” (Barthes 
1981, p.92). Barthes, here, highlights another theme throughout this analysis, that of the 
nature of the photograph as a recording of the present as an ‘already past’. The taking of the 
picture separates the current from the printed evidence of its existence. For Barthes, when 
viewing the portrait of his recently passed away mother, there is the highlighting of 
impermanence while the image fades and that situation, lost as a present to the taking of the 
image, is also lost to time. The selfie pushes this temporal relation to the past and future into 
the present through its nature as an embodied gesture both showing the viewer the self, but 
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also commanding to look at the self looking at the self. This allows the selfie to engage in the 
possibility of bringing the aspiration to normalcy and beauty out of a form of cruel optimism 
though hope and joy. It also provides an engagement with narcissism, allowing for a reclaiming 
not just of self-appreciation, but of the visualisation of madness as Other.  
The final section of analysis critiques care and selfies as neoliberal acts. While Ahmed’s 
response is critical to pay attention to, it is also crucial to note that selfies are neither utopian 
nor revolutionary. They are not a perfect form of care and reproduce many repressive 
characteristics in the production and distribution, however, when used by those with mental 
illnesses create new meaning and allow a signification of the self - a radical move for the 
madness excluded and Othered since the 18th century.  
Not talked about in this research is the participant who rarely, if ever took selfies. This person 
could not conceptualise the act, with the gazing upon their own body and the stress of sharing 
this to others, as care. Instead it was an intense moment of anxiety. This anxiety was also 
mentioned by those who did take selfies, yet it was a joyful anxiety that stabilised their 
identity and brought forward self-confidence in being able to visualise themselves under their 
own means. When it is hard to love your image, the taking of a selfie can be impossible. Yet 
when the anxiousness that come along with it becomes a hopeful moment and the disabled 
subject is allowed to appreciate the self, a truly important event has taken place.  
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